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CONTENTSAbstract
We determine optimal discretionary monetary policy in a New-Keynesian model
when nominal interest rates are bounded below by zero. Nominal interest rates
should be lowered faster in response to adverse shocks than in the case without
bound. Such ‘preemptive easing’ is optimal because expectations of a possibly
binding bound in the future amplify the eects of adverse shocks. Calibrating
the model to the U.S. economy we ﬁnd the easing eect to be quantitatively
important. Moreover,
signiﬁcant welfare losses. Losses increase further when inﬂation is partly de-
termined by lagged inﬂation in the Phillips curve. Targeting positive inﬂation
rates reduces the frequency of a binding lower bound, but tends to reduce welfare
compared to a target rate of zero. The welfare gains from policy commitment,
however, appear signiﬁcant and are much larger than in the case without lower
bound.
JEL classification  :C63,E31,E52
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the lower bound binds rather frequently and imposes
Keywords:   nonlinear   policy;   zero   lower   bound;   liquidit  y   trapIn the recent past nominal interest rates in major world economies have
reached historically low levels. The inability to further lower nominal interest
rates can lead to higher than desired real interest rates and it is often feared
that the economy might then embark on a deﬂationary path, often referred to
as a ‘liquidity trap’.
This paper uses a standard monetary policy model with nominal rigidities,
the so-called New Keynesian model, and determines optimal monetary policy,
taking explicitly into account that nominal interest rates cannot be set to nega-
tive values. We thereby focus on the case of discretionary policy making where
decisions are taken in a day-by-day fashion. In particular, the paper determines
the quantitative implications of the zero lower bound for discretionary monetary
policy in the U.S., using estimates of the shock processes that hit the economy
during the period 1983-2002.
With discretionary policy the welfare losses inﬂicted by the zero lower bound
appear signiﬁcant. This diers notably from the case with policy commitment,
i.e., the case where the policymaker can engage in credible promises about its
own behavior in the future.
We show that when adverse shocks threaten to push the economy into a
situation with zero nominal interest rates, it turns out optimal to lower nominal
rates more aggressively in advance, i.e., already before hitting the bound. Such
‘preemptive’ action is optimal because agents anticipate the possibility of bind-
ing shocks in the future and thereby tend to amplify the eects of adverse shocks
via an adjustment of their expectations. A stronger policy response counteracts
this ampliﬁcation.
Optimal discretionary policy that targets an average inﬂation rate of zero
implies that shocks to the so-called ‘natural’ real rate of interest cause the lower
bound to become binding rather frequently in the U.S. economy. Therefore,
we consider whether it is possible to improve upon this situation by targeting
5
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Non-technical summarya positive average inﬂation rate. This increases average nominal interest rates
and thereby reduces the risk of hitting the zero lower bound. Such a policy has
been frequently suggested in the literature. We ﬁnd that positive target rates
do reduce the likelihood with which the lower bound is reached but also tend to
reduce welfare because they increase the average inﬂation rate. This suggests
that one should be careful in judging the welfare consequences of monetary
policies by looking solely at the frequency with which the lower bound is reached.
Besides addressing substantive economic questions, this paper also imple-
ments a new approach to numerically solving discretionary nonlinear optimal
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The relevance of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates for the con-
duct of monetary policy is a much debated topic among both policymakers and
academics. Clearly, the economic experience of Japan during the last decade
as well as the low levels of nominal interest rates prevailing in Europe and the
United States contribute to the renewed interest in this topic.1
While deﬂationary pressures seem eventually to be subsiding, a systematic
investigation of how to conduct monetary policy when interest rate decisions are
subject to the zero lower bound remains an open question of considerable inter-
est. This knowledge would be relevant for dealing with similar policy problems
should they reemerge in the future.
This paper studies optimal monetary policy under discretion in a canonical
New Keynesian model featuring monopolistic competition and sticky prices in
the product market (see Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (2003)).
The contribution made here is to analyze a fully stochastic setup that takes ex-
plicitly into account the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. The paper
also introduces a new numerical algorithm for solving discretionary nonlinear
optimal policy problems with endogenous state variables. The algorithm is com-
plementary to ﬁrst order based approaches, but has the crucial advantage that
one can numerically verify in a simple way whether second order conditions are
actually satisﬁed.
Studying a fully stochastic setup is of economic interest for a number of
reasons. First, it allows us to calibrate the model to the U.S. economy and to
study the quantitative importance of the zero lower bound. Second, we can
assess how policy should react in a situation where interest rates are low but
still positive and future adverse shocks may drive the economy into a situation
where the lower bound is binding. This appears to be especially important in the
1For recent discussions see Auerbach and Obstfeld (2003), Coenen and Wieland (2003),
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), and Svensson (2003).
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instead has focused exclusively on situations where the zero lower bound is
currently binding but never returns to being binding again some time onwards
in the future.2
As a benchmark, we analyze a purely forward-looking model that is cali-
brated to the U.S. economy. We ﬁnd that the lower bound is reached frequently,
inﬂicting sizeable welfare losses.3 Based on our estimates of the historical U.S.
shock processes for the period 1983-2002, the welfare losses are roughly 16%
higher than those generated if nominal interest rates were allowed instead to
become negative.4 In a hybrid speciﬁcation, where inﬂation is also partly de-
termined by lagged inﬂation, the welfare losses tend to be even larger.
These results diers considerably from the case with policy commitment,
which is analyzed in a companion paper of ours, see Adam and Billi (2004). In
a purely forward-looking model the additional welfare losses generated by the
zero lower bound are then below 1%. The existence of a lower bound entails
that there are important welfare gains from policy commitment.
We ﬁnd that nominal interest rates should be lowered faster in response to
a fall in the natural real rate than if nominal interest rates were allowed to
become negative.5 The required ‘preemptive easing’ of policy is quantitatively
important for the U.S. economy. For our baseline model we ﬁnd that (depending
on the state of the economy) one should set nominal interest rates as much as
75 basis points below the level suggested by a model abstracting from the zero
lower bound.
This result emerges because expectations signiﬁcantly reinforce the eects
of adverse shocks. A binding lower bound implies deﬂation and output losses in
2See, for example, Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Svensson (2003), or Jung et al. (2001).
3For our baseline calibration zero nominal rates would occur in about one quarter every
ﬁve years on average.
4Losses are then due to nominal price rigidities only.
5T h en a t u r a lr e a lr a t ei st h er e a li n t e r e s tr a t eo ft h e( e !cient) ﬂexible price equilibrium.
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therefore, they reduce output and inﬂation expectations correspondingly. Since
lower expected output and inﬂation lead to lower current values of these vari-
ables, it is optimal to reduce nominal interest rates.
The deﬂationary pressure generated by the lower bound causes a so-called
‘deﬂation bias’, i.e., a drop of the average inﬂation rate below its target level.
This eect, however, is quantitatively small in the order of less than 10 basis
points for our baseline calibration. Moreover, the lower bound does not generate
an ‘output bias’, i.e., a downward distortion of average output. While a binding
bound does lead to output losses, the lower nominal interest rates implemented
before the bound is reached generate positive output gaps that compensate for
these losses on average.
Since targeting positive inﬂation rates is frequently suggested as a remedy
to overcome the constraints imposed by the zero lower bound, we investigate
the welfare consequences of such policies. We ﬁnd that small positive target
levels for inﬂation, e.g., 10 basis points annually, have the potential to increase
welfare. Policies that cause the zero bound to be signiﬁcantly less binding, e.g.,
inﬂation targets of about 50 basis points annually, generate large additional
welfare losses. This suggests that one should be careful in judging the welfare
consequences of monetary policies by looking solely at the frequency with which
the zero lower bound is reached.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses
the related literature. Section 3 introduces the economic model and the policy
problem. Section 4 deﬁnes the rational expectations equilibrium with discre-
tionary monetary policy, and section 5 presents the calibration of the model for
the U.S. economy. Section 6 analytically determines the perfect foresight equi-
librium. Section 7 discusses the numerical results for the stochastic equilibrium
and analyzes the welfare eects of targeting positive inﬂation rates. Section 8
checks for the robustness of our ﬁndings to alternative parameterizations and
9
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curve. Section 9 brieﬂy concludes.
2 Related Literature
The literature on monetary policy under discretion was initiated by the seminal
contributions of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983).
While their models lacked explicit microfoundations, the recent development
of general equilibrium models with monopolistic competition and sticky prices
allows to extend earlier analyses to fully microfounded models, see Clarida et
al. (1999) and Woodford (2003).6
Overall, the literature following Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and
Gordon (1983) has tended to stress the ‘inﬂationary bias’ associated with discre-
tionary monetary policy and its potential solutions, see Persson and Tabellini
(1994).
Krugman (1998) seems to have been the ﬁrst to note that when taking into
account the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates the credibility problem
may equally generate a ‘deﬂation bias’. This emerges because the policy maker
cannot engage in credible promises about the conduct of future monetary policy,
which is the only policy instrument left once the zero lower bound is binding.7
Eggertsson (2003) and Jeanne and Svensson (2004) build upon this idea and
discuss potential solutions to the credibility problem.
Nakov (2004) compares the performance of simple rules to that of optimal
discretionary policy and ﬁnds that simple rules perform almost as good as opti-
mal discretionary policy. Following simple rules, however, requires commitment
power. We show that the welfare gains from commitment to an optimal rule
6Using general equilibrium models with sticky prices, Albanesi et al. (2002), and King
and Wolman (2003) recently highlighted that when monetary authorities act under discretion
there is the possibility of having multiple steady states.
7Any monetary expansion implemented during a time of zero nominal interest rates is
expected to be reversed once the lower bound ceases to be binding.
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Adam and Billi (2004).
3 The Model
We consider a simple and well-known monetary policy model of a representa-
tive consumer and ﬁrms in monopolistic competition facing restrictions on the
frequency of price adjustments (Calvo (1983)). Following Rotemberg (1987),
this is often referred to as the ‘New Keynesian’ model, that has frequently been
studied in the literature, e.g., Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999) and Woodford
(2003).
We augment this otherwise standard monetary policy model by explicitly














t = Ett+1 + yt + ut (2)
yt = Etyt+1  *(it  Ett+1)+gt (3)
it  r (4)
ut = uut1 + %u,t (5)
gt = ggt1 + %g,t (6)
behavior of future monetary authorities is given (7)
u0, g0 given (8)
where t denotes the inﬂation rate, yt the output gap, and it the nominal
interest rate expressed as deviation from the interest rate consistent with the
zero inﬂation steady state.
Assuming that monetary policy cannot commit to future plans, one solves
11
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August 2004problem (1)-(8) period by period. In other terms, the policymaker rationally an-
ticipates its inability to commit, therefore, treats the behavior in future periods
as given. This is captured by constraint (7).
The monetary policy objective (1) is a quadratic approximation to the util-
ity of the representative household, where the weight  > 0 depends on the
underlying preference and technology parameters. Equation (2) is a forward-
looking Phillips curve summarizing, up to ﬁrst order, proﬁt-maximizing price
setting behavior by ﬁrms, where  5 (0,1) denotes the discount factor and  > 0
depends on the underlying utility and technology parameters.8 Equation (3) is
a linearized Euler equation summarizing households’ intertemporal maximiza-
tion, where * > 0 denotes the interest rate elasticity of output. The shock gt
captures the variation in the ‘natural’ real interest rate and is usually referred
to as a real rate shock, i.e.,
gt = *(rt  r) (9)
where the natural real rate rt is the real interest rate consistent with the ﬂexible
price equilibrium and r =1 /  1 is the real rate of the deterministic zero
inﬂation steady state.9 The requirement that nominal interest rates have to
remain positive is captured by constraint (4). Finally, equations (5) and (6)
describe the evolution of the stochastic shock processes, where j 5 (1,1) and
%j,t  iiN(0,2
j) for j = u,g.10
8The case with a hybrid Phillips curve where inﬂation depends also on lagged inﬂation is
considered in section 8.
9The shock gt summarizes all shocks that under ﬂexible prices generate time variation in the
real interest rate, therefore, it captures the combined eects of preference shocks, productivity
shocks, and exogenous changes in government expenditure.
10As shown in Adam and Billi (2004), this speciﬁcation of the shock processes is su!ciently
general to describe the historical sequence of shocks in the U.S. economy for the period 1983:1-
2002:4 that we consider.
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3.1.1 Relation to earlier work
The new feature of our policy problem is both the presence of the lower bound
(4) and of the stochastic disturbances %u,t and %g,t. These elements together
render the policy problem nonlinear, since the disturbances will cause the lower
bound to be occasionally binding, see Christiano and Fisher (2000).
The model without lower bound is analyzed in Clarida, Galí and Gertler
(1999). Without lower bound the policy problem is linear quadratic, so one can
solve for the equilibrium dynamics analytically using standard methods. Jung,
Teranishi, and Watanabe (2001) consider a model with lower bound but assume
perfect foresight. In their model the lower bound may be binding in t =0 ,
but never returns to being binding again some time onwards in the future. As
shown below, the equilibrium of a stochastic economy diers considerably from
such a perfect foresight solution, because shocks may always drive the economy
into a situation with a binding lower bound.
3.1.2 Policy instruments
It should be stressed that here the interest rate is assumed to be the only avail-
able policy instrument. We thereby abstract from a number of alternative pol-
icy instruments that might be important in a situation of zero nominal interest
rates, most notably ﬁscal policy, exchange rate policy, and quantity-based mon-
etary policies. Our setup, thus, tends to give prominence if not overemphasize
the policy implications of the zero nominal interest rate bound.
While the omission of ﬁscal policies clearly constitutes a shortcoming that
ought to be addressed in future work, ignoring exchange rate and money policies
may be less severe than one might initially think.11
Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2001), e.g., show that one can reinterpret the
11Eggertsson (2003) considers discretionary monetary and ﬁscal policy with a lower bound
in a perfect foresight economy.
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mapping between interest rate policies and exchange rate policies. It is then
inessential whether policy is formulated in terms of interest rates or exchange
rates.
Similarly, ignoring quantity-oriented monetary policies in the form of open
market operations during periods of zero nominal interest rates seems to be
of little relevance. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) show that in the present
model such policies have no eect on the equilibrium, unless they inﬂuence
the future path of interest rates. Under discretion, however, monetary policy
cannot commit to a future path, thereby base money policies are irrelevant for
the equilibrium outcome.
We recognize that alternative policy instruments may still be relevant in
practice.12 Focusing on interest rate policy in isolation is nevertheless of inter-
est, since it allows one to assess what interest rate policy alone can achieve in
alleviating the negative eect of the zero bound. This seems important for one
to know, given that alternative instruments are often subject to (potentially
uncertain) political approval by external authorities and may therefore not be
readily available.
3.1.3 How much non-linearity?
We now brieﬂy comment on the fact that we use linear approximations to the
ﬁrst order conditions of households and ﬁrms, i.e., equations (2) and (3), and a
quadratic approximation to the objective function, i.e., equation (1), instead of
the fully nonlinear model. Doing so means that the only nonlinearity that we
take account of is the one imposed by the zero lower bound (4).13
12See Eggertsson (2003) on how other policy instruments, e.g., nominal debt policy, may be
used as a commitment device.
13Technically, this approach is equivalent to linearizing the ﬁrst order conditions of the
nonlinear Ramsey problem around the ﬁrst best steady state except for the non-negativity
constraint for nominal interest rates that is kept in its original nonlinear form. This holds
because deriving ﬁrst order conditions and linearizing thereafter is equivalent to linearizing
ﬁrst and then taking derivatives.
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is that for the empirically relevant shock support and the estimated value of
the discount factor the linearizations (2) and (3) may perform poorly at the
lower bound. However, this depends on the degree of nonlinearity present in
the economy, an issue about which relatively little seems to be known.
A paramount advantage of focusing on the nonlinearities induced by the
lower bound alone is that we do not have to parameterize higher order terms
in our empirical application later on.14 In addition, one can economize in the
dimension of the state space. A fully nonlinear setup would require instead an
additional state variable to keep track over time of the higher-order eects of
price dispersion, as shown by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003).
A positive by-product of all this is that the results remain easily compara-
ble to the standard linear-quadratic analysis without lower bound, as the only
dierence consists of imposing equation (4).
4 Discretionary Equilibrium
We restrict attention to stationary Markov perfect equilibria in which the policy
functions depend on the current predetermined states ut and gt only.15
A Markov perfect equilibrium consists of policy functions y(ut,g t), (ut,g t),
and i(ut,g t) that solve problem (1)-(8) when the expectations in equations (2)
and (3) are given by
Ett+1 =
Z




y(uut + %u,t+1,ggt + %g,t+1)f(%u,t+1,%g,t+1)d(%u,t+1,%g,t+1)
(11)
14Calibrating the higher order terms would probably amount to choosing relatively arbitrary
values given the available knowledge of the economy under exam.
15When considering a model with lagged inﬂation in the Phillips curve, as in section 8,
policy functions also depend on lagged inﬂation rates.
15
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 380
August 2004
where f(·,·) is the probability density function of (%u,%g).Equations (10) and (11) show that the solution to problem (1)-(8) enters
the constraints (2) and (3). Solving for the equilibrium, thus, requires ﬁnding
a ﬁxed point in the space of policy functions.
We numerically solve for the ﬁxed point as follows. We guess initial policy
functions and then compute the associated expectations in equations (10) and
(11). Given the expectations, problem (1)-(8) is a simple static one-period
maximization problem, where the ﬁrst order conditions can be used to determine
updated policy functions.16 We iterate in this manner until convergence. The
numerical procedure is described in detail in appendix A.1.
5 Calibration to U.S. Economy
To calibrate the model to the U.S. economy we use the parameterization from
Adam and Billi (2004), that is based on the results of Rotemberg and Woodford
(1998) and our estimates of the U.S. shock processes for 1983:1-2002:4. The pa-
rameter values are summarized in table 1 and serve as the baseline calibration of
the model. The implied steady state real interest rate for this parameterization
is 3.5% annually. In section 8 we check the robustness of our results to various
changes in this baseline parameterization.
6 Perfect Foresight
To gain intuition for our numerical ﬁndings, this section analytically determines
the Markov perfect equilibrium under perfect foresight. For simplicity, we ab-
stract from time variations in the mark-up shock ut and focus on variations of
t h er e a lr a t es h o c kgt instead.17
16In the purely forward-looking model considered here second order conditions hold because
the discretionary maximization problem is static and the one-period return function is concave
(quadratic).
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gc = *r




j1) for j =1 ,2,3...
Under perfect foresight these intervals have the convenient property that if gt 5
Ij then gt+1 5 Ij1 for all j>0. The interval I0 is an absorbing interval that
is reached in ﬁnite time for any initial value g0.
In appendix A.2 the following result is shown:
Proposition 1 Suppose %u,t = %g,t =0and u0 =0 . There exists a Markov






*gf o r g  gc
r for g <gc
(12)
and in which the output gap and inﬂation are continuous functions of g.F o r
g 5 I0 the output gap and inﬂation are equal to zero. For g 5 Ij (j>0) the
output gap and inﬂation are negative and linearly increasing in g at a rate that
increases with j.
Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium for the case with lower bound (solid line)
and without lower bound (dashed line with circles) when using the U.S. baseline
calibration from table 1.18
Without lower bound real rate shocks do not generate any policy trade-o.
The policymaker neutralizes variations in the natural real rate by adjusting
nominal interest rates appropriately.
Instead, with lower bound it remains optimal to mimic this policy as long
as the lower bound is not reached, but to set nominal interest rates to zero once
18For this calibration gc E3 5.47.
17
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 380
August 2004the natural real rate drops below the critical value gc. Output then falls short
of potential and inﬂation becomes negative.
Figure 1 also shows that, as stated in proposition 1, the eects of a marginal
reduction of g on output and inﬂation are increasing as the real rate becomes
more negative. More negative values for g also imply more negative values of
expected future output and inﬂation. This reinforces the downward pressure on
current output and inﬂation stemming from low values of the real rate shock,
see equations (2) and (3).
7 Stochastic Equilibrium
This section presents the stochastic Markov perfect equilibrium for the baseline
parameterization in table 1.19 The sensitivity of our results to alternative model
speciﬁcations and parameterizations is discussed in section 8.
7.1 Impact on Average Values
We ﬁrst discuss the eect of the nonlinearities on average output and inﬂation.
Since we have a nonlinear stochastic model the average values of endogenous
variables will generally dier from their steady state values due to a breakdown
of certainty equivalence.
The perfect foresight solution presented in section 6 suggests that both av-
erage output and inﬂation fall short of their steady state value, i.e., zero. Our
stochastic simulations show, however, that the downward bias for average in-
ﬂation is rather small, i.e., in the order of less than 8 basis points annually. In
addition, average output displays a slight upward distortion of about 0.6 basis
points. Therefore, biases for average output and inﬂation are relatively small
and not even of the sign suggested by the perfect foresight solution.20
19All variables are expressed in terms of percentage point deviations from steady state
values; interest rates and inﬂation rates are expressed in annualized percentage deviations;
the real rate shock and the mark-up shock are expressed as their quarterly percentage values.
20Overall, the ﬁndings parallel those for the case of policy commitment, see Adam and Billi
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at the stochastic equilibrium in greater detail and presents the optimal policy
functions.
7.2 Optimal Policy Response to Shocks
We ﬁrst discuss the optimal policy reaction to mark-up shocks and then discuss
that to real rate shocks.
We ﬁnd that in equilibrium the zero lower bound does not impose a binding
constraint on dealing with mark-up shocks. The empirical variability of these
shocks is simply too small for the policy constraint to matter. The left-hand
panels of ﬁgure 2 display the optimal response of output, inﬂation, and nominal
interest rates to mark-up shocks.21 The solid line corresponds to the reaction
function if the bound is imposed, while the dashed line with circles refers to the
case where nominal interest rates are allowed to become negative. The ﬁgure
shows that the optimal reaction to mark-up shocks is virtually unaected by
the presence of the zero lower bound. Moreover, the lower bound remains far
from being binding, even for very negative values of the mark-up shock.
The situation diers notably when considering real-rate shocks. The right-
hand side panels of ﬁgure 2 depict the optimal response of output, inﬂation, and
nominal rates to real rate shocks. Again, the solid line corresponds to the case
where the lower bound is imposed while the dashed line with circles denotes the
equilibrium response when nominal rates are allowed to become negative. This
ﬁgure reveals a number of interesting features, especially when compared to the
perfect foresight solution depicted in ﬁgure 1.
First, while large negative values of the real rate shock result in negative
output gaps and deﬂation, these eects are now much more pronounced than
(2004), and suggest that empirically observed average biases are unlikely to be informative
about whether policy acts under discretion or commitment.
21The ﬁgure depicts policy responses over a range of ±4 unconditional standard deviations.
The values of state variables not shown on the x-axis is set equal to zero.
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doubles and the maximum deﬂation is about triple.
Second, as illustrated in ﬁgure 3 in greater detail, the zero lower bound now
binds much earlier than under perfect foresight, since interest rates are lowered
more aggressively in response to negative real rate shocks. For our calibration
the presence of the lower bound might require setting nominal interest rates up
to 75 basis points lower than if nominal rates were allowed to become negative
or than under perfect foresight.
Third, ﬁgure 3 reveals that the output gap becomes slightly positive and
inﬂation slightly negative well before the zero lower bound starts to be binding.
Thus, real rate shocks generate a policy trade o between output and inﬂation
stabilization even before the zero lower bound is reached.
All these features emerge because shocks may drive the economy from a
situation with positive nominal interest rates into one where the lower bound is
binding. Since output and inﬂation are negative once the lower bound is reached,
the possibility of a binding lower bound in the future generates a downward bias
in expected output and expected inﬂation well before interest rates hit the lower
bound.22
This reduction in expected future output and inﬂation is isomorphic to a
negative mark-up shock and a negative real rate shock in equations (2) and
(3), respectively. To both shocks the policymaker reacts by lowering nominal
interest rates, this explains the ‘preemptive easing’ of interest rates that can be
observed in the lower panel of ﬁgure 3.
Negative mark-up shocks, however, generate a policy trade-o and policy
reacts to them by letting output rise and inﬂation fall, see ﬁgure 2. The down-
ward bias in expectations, therefore, also explains the output boom that can
22Technically: since the policy functions of output and inﬂation depicted in ﬁgure 1 are
concave, Jensen’s inequality implies a downward bias once we allow for uncertainty about the
future value of the natural real rate.
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enters the binding area.
Finally, the downward bias of expected future values due to the presence
of shocks generates a downward bias for actual values of output and inﬂation.
This in turn justiﬁes even lower expectations. This complementarity between
expectations and outcomes explains the large dierences in magnitudes implied
by the perfect foresight equilibrium and the stochastic equilibrium.
7.3 Welfare Losses and Frequency of Zero Nominal Rates
In this section we discuss how often the zero lower bound is binding and assess
the welfare implications of the zero lower bound.
Figure 2 already indicates that the lower bound is reached quite often.23 Our
simulations show that under optimal discretionary policy zero nominal interest
rates occur about one quarter every 5.5 years on average. Yet, zero nominal
rates persist for only 1.67 quarters on average, i.e., a relatively short period of
time.
Zero nominal rates, therefore, emerge much more frequently than in the
case with policy commitment, where the bound was reached instead in about
one quarter every 17 years on average, see Adam and Billi (2004). The average
persistence of zero nominal rates under discretionary policy, however, is roughly
comparable to the case with policy commitment.24
Table 2 presents the welfare losses that arise by imposing the zero bound on
nominal interest rates.25 The table reports losses for the cases with and without
23The ﬁgure shows policy reactions over the range of ±4 unconditional standard deviations
of the shocks. Already a 32 standard deviation value of the real rate shock leads to a binding
lower bound.
24The average persistence under commitment is about 1.37 quarters.
25The table reports the average discounted losses over random initial draws of u0 and g0
from their stationary distribution. To compute the average we take 1000 simulations with a
length of 1000 periods each.
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bound and with and without commitment.26Due to the strong forward-looking elements in the underlying economic
model, there are considerable welfare gains from commitment even if the lower
bound is not imposed. These gains increase even further once the lower bound
is taken into account.
When the lower bound is reached, commitments about the future path of
policy are the only available monetary policy instrument. Since this instrument
is unavailable to a discretionary policy maker, the lower bound increases welfare
losses roughly by 15% under discretionary policy, while the same ﬁgure is about
1% for the case with commitment. This suggests that one may signiﬁcantly
underestimate the welfare gains from policy commitment if ignoring the zero
lower bound on nominal interest rates.
7.4 Positive Inﬂation Targets
Given the results shown so far, it seems rather unlikely that monetary authorities
in the United States maximize a social welfare function under discretion. It
would imply that nominal interest rates are more often at zero and inﬂation is
lower than was the case during the last two decades.
One plausible explanation for this is that U.S. monetary authorities target
an inﬂation rate larger than zero. Many central banks (apart from the Federal
Reserve) explicitly state positive target levels for inﬂation. Moreover, academics
and policymakers alike frequently argue in favor of slightly positive inﬂation
levels, partly as a way to overcome the adverse consequences of a binding zero
lower bound on nominal rates, e.g., Coenen, Orphanides, and Wieland (2004),
Bernanke (2002), and Trichet (2003).
Here we take up this issue and evaluate the eectiveness of positive inﬂation
targets in achieving welfare superior outcomes.27 From the theory of the second
26In the case without lower bound losses are generated by nominal price rigidities only.
27As pointed out by Vestin (2002) and Wolman (2003) it might be better to assign a price
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ﬂation targets may potentially improve upon the discretionary policy outcome.





(t  )2 + y2
t
¢
where   0 denotes the target rate for inﬂation.
Figure 4 illustrates the eects of positive inﬂation targets for average inﬂa-
tion, the frequency with which zero nominal rates are reached, and the average
persistence of zero nominal interest rates. Positive inﬂation targets raise average
inﬂation rates and are quite eective in reducing the frequency with which the
lower bound binds. Already modest target rates of 50 basis points annually sig-
niﬁcantly reduce the likelihood of zero nominal interest rates. Positive targets
rates also slightly reduce the average persistence of zero nominal rates.
While this suggests that positive inﬂation targets might be a useful tool to
ameliorate the policy constraints imposed by the zero lower bound, these results
ignore the adverse welfare consequences of positive inﬂation rates.
Figure 5 illustrates the welfare losses for various levels of the inﬂation tar-
get.28 Modest target rates of about 10 basis points have the potential to increase
welfare slightly. Average inﬂation is then approximately equal to zero, see ﬁg-
ure 4. Target rates that signiﬁcantly reduce the likelihood of hitting the lower
bound, e.g., an inﬂation target of 50 basis points, lead to very large welfare
losses, up to 50% above those that would be achieved with a zero inﬂation tar-
get. This suggests that the frequency with which zero nominal rates are binding
is not necessarily indicative of the welfare losses associated with a given inﬂation
target.
level target instead of an inﬂation target. As shown by these authors, this would make the
inﬂation rate history dependent in a way that mimics the commitment solution.
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In this section we report the results of robustness exercises regarding the model
speciﬁcation and parameterization.
8.1 Hybrid Phillips Curve
In the benchmark model considered thus far inﬂation is assumed to be purely
forward-looking. A number of econometric studies, however, suggest that inﬂa-
tion is at least partly determined by lagged inﬂation rates, e.g. Galí and Gertler
(1999).
This section studies the implications of allowing inﬂation to depend on lagged
inﬂation rates. In particular, we consider the policy problem (1)-(8) when the




[Ett+1 + t1 + yt + ut] (13)
where   0 is an ‘indexation parameter’ that indicates the degree to which
ﬁrms automatically adjust their prices to lagged inﬂation rates when they do
not fully reoptimize prices, see Woodford (2003).29
For  =0equation (13) reduces to the forward-looking Phillips curve (2).
For  > 0 inﬂation is partly determined by lagged inﬂation, which becomes an
endogenous state variable of the system. Solving the policy problem is then
more involved, since the discretionary maximization problem fails to be static.
In particular, the optimal policy functions now depend on the exogenous shocks
(u,g) and also on the lagged inﬂation rate 1. We assume that the current
29As shown in Woodford (2003), lagged inﬂation appearing in the Phillips curve aects the
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of future authorities to its own actions.
Appendix A.3 describes the numerical algorithm used to solve the model,
which can be seen as a generalization to a nonlinear setup of the algorithm
described in Söderlind (1999). The algorithm is based on a value function rep-
resentation of the policy problem, and has the advantage that it allows to verify
numerically whether second order conditions actually hold for the solution de-
rived.
From the economic viewpoint, introducing lagged inﬂation gives rise to two
opposing eects. On the one hand, it alleviates the problems of discretionary
policy making: by inﬂuencing current inﬂation rates the policymaker can aect
future policy decisions since these depend on lagged inﬂation. On the other
hand, the presence of lagged inﬂation is potentially damaging because inﬂation
now displays more persistence than in a purely forward-looking model; this may
cause real interest rates to remain undesirably high for a longer period of time.
We ﬁnd that for our calibration to the U.S. economy the second eect
strongly dominates. For small degrees of indexation, e.g.,  =0 .15,t h ea d -
ditional welfare losses generated by imposing the zero lower bound are about
37%. The additional losses in our baseline model ( =0 ) are approximately
15%. Moreover, higher degrees of inﬂation indexation lead to a rapid increase
in the welfare losses. For example, increasing  just slightly to 0.16 raises the
additional welfare losses to 49% already. For larger values of  our numerical
algorithm then fails to converge.
In addition, we ﬁnd that endogenous inﬂation persistence signiﬁcantly in-
creases the amount of deﬂation and the size of output losses associated with
negative values of the real rate shock. Also, the policymaker has to ease mon-
etary policy even more aggressively than in a purely forward-looking speciﬁca-
tion. Average inﬂation rates and output losses, however, seem to be aected
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only slightly.30
30For  =0 .16 the average annual inﬂation rate drops to about -17 basis points and the
average output gap increases to +1.2 basis points.Overall, these results suggest that endogenous inﬂation persistence signiﬁ-
cantly ampliﬁes the welfare costs of the zero lower bound, and that most of the
quantitative results are rather sensitive to the presence of lagged inﬂation in the
Phillips curve. Qualitatively, however, the ﬁndings parallel those of the purely
forward-looking model.
8.2 More Variable Shocks
We also consider the sensitivity of our results to the benchmark parameterization
of the shock processes in table 1. In particular, we assess the eects of an
increased variability of the disturbances, motivated by the fact that the period
1983-2002 that we use to estimate the shock processes is generally considered
to be a relatively ‘calm’ period, e.g., compared to the 1970s.
Results are remarkably stable with respect to changes in the variance of
mark-up shocks. This holds even if we double the variance 2
u of the mark-up
shock innovations. Instead, results are rather sensitive to the parameterization
of the real rate process, i.e., to changes in the persistence parameter g and
the variance 2
g of the real rate shock innovations. A slight increase in one
of these parameters considerably increases the welfare losses generated by the
zero lower bound.31 More persistent and more variable natural real rate shocks
increase the likelihood of a binding bound in the future and thereby increase
the downward bias of output and inﬂation expectations, see the discussion in
section 7.2. As a result, interest rates have to be lowered even faster and the
lower bound constrains policy more often.
31Increasing the variance j2
g by only 10% raises the additional welfare losses from the zero
lower bound to 43%. Raising the persistence of 4g to 0.81 increases the additional losses to
45%. For the baseline calibration this number was roughly 16%.
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Our benchmark calibration of table 1 assumes an interest rate elasticity of out-
put of * =6 .25, which seems to lie on the high side for plausible estimates of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution.32 Therefore, we also consider a calibra-
tion with * =1 , that corresponds to log utility in consumption, and constitutes
the usual benchmark parameterization in the real business cycle literature. This
calibration is taken from our companion paper, see Adam and Billi (2004), and
is summarized in table 3.
With this calibration, the lower bound is now reached even more frequently,
namely about once every three quarters on average. The average inﬂation rate
drops to 0.38% annually and the additional welfare losses from the lower bound
surge to 67%. However, these features emerge mainly because the calibration
in table 3 implies a slightly more variable natural real rate process than the one
implied by the baseline calibration of table 1.
9C o n c l u s i o n s
When U.S. monetary authorities maximize social welfare in a discretionary way,
the zero lower bound seems to inﬂict signiﬁcant welfare losses. Once the zero
lower bound is binding the inability to commit to future policies deprives mon-
etary policymakers of their policy instruments.
Uncertainty about the future natural real rate has a signiﬁcant impact on the
equilibrium outcome. The anticipation of possibly binding shocks in the future
lowers expectations of future output and inﬂation, thereby leads to an increase in
real interest rates already before the zero lower bound is reached. Policymakers
react to such pressures by reducing nominal rates more aggressively, causing the
lower bound to be reached even earlier.
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policy by the zero lower bound, the welfare gains of positive inﬂation targets
seem rather limited. Indeed, considerable welfare losses may be associated with
even moderately positive target levels.
A Appendix
A.1 Numerical algorithm (forward-looking Phillips curve)
We deﬁne a grid of N interpolation nodes over the state space (u,g) and evaluate
functions at intermediate values resorting to linear interpolation. The expec-
tations deﬁned in equations (10) and (11) are evaluated at each interpolation
node using an M node Gaussian-Hermite quadrature scheme.33 Our numerical
algorithm consists of the following steps:
Step 1: Choose N and M and assign the interpolation and quadrature nodes.
Guess initial values for the policy functions y0, 0,a n di0 at the interpo-
lation nodes.
Step 2: At each interpolation node compute the expectations (10) and (11) implied
by the current guess yk, k,a n dik. Then employ the ﬁrst order conditions
of (1)-(8) to derive a new guess for the policy functions in the following
way. At each interpolation node, ﬁrst assume it > r. The ﬁrst order





This together with (2) delivers the implied values for yt and t. Plugging
these into (3) delivers a value for it.I fit > r, as initially conjectured,
one has found a solution. Otherwise, set i = r and solve (2) and (3) for
yt and t. Performing this at each node delivers a new guess yk+1, k+1,
and ik+1.
33See chapter 7 in Judd (1998) for details.
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k  k+1|max ,|ik  ik+1|max} <  where
|·|max denotes the maximum absolute norm and  > 0 the tolerance level.
Otherwise continue with step 2.
In our application we set N = 275 and M =9 . Relatively more nodes are
placed in areas of the state space where the policies display a higher degree of
curvature, i.e., at negative values of g where the lower bound is reached. The
support of the interpolation nodes is chosen to cover ±4 unconditional standard
deviations for each of the shocks. The tolerance level is  =1 .49108,i . e . ,t h e
square root of machine precision. Our initial guess is given by the policy that
is optimal in the absence of the zero lower bound.
A.2 Proof of proposition 1
Suppose g 5 I0,t h e ng0 5 I0 where g0 denotes the value of g in the subsequent
period. Given the interest rate policy (12), equations (2) and (3) imply that
 = y =0constitutes a perfect foresight equilibrium for all g 5 I0. Clearly, the
interest rate policy (12) is optimal for all g 5 I0.
Now suppose g 5 I1. Since this implies that g0 5 I0, we can solve the problem
by backward induction: g0 5 I0 implies that the private sector’s expectations
are given by E0 = Ey0 =0 . It then follows from equations (2), (3), and (12)
that
y = gc + g (15)
 = gc + g (16)
Note that output and inﬂation are continuous in the transition from I1 to I0
and linear in g for g 5 I1. One can iterate in this manner to obtain output and
inﬂation for I2,I3,.... Continuity and linearity of all equations involved thereby
implies that output and inﬂation are continuous functions of g.M o r e o v e r ,f o r
the stated interest rate policy output and inﬂation in each interval Ij are linear
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Using equations (17) and (18) and the law of motion for g to construct expec-
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Iterating on this equation implies that
s2 = s1 + As1
s3 = s2 + A2s1











Since s1 > 0 and all entries in A are positive, this shows that the slopes
sj are increasing in j. Since output and inﬂation are negative for g 5 I1 it
follows from continuity and the values of sj that they are negative for all g 5 Ij
with j>1. Therefore, zero nominal interest rates are optimal for g 5 Ij with
j>1, since positive nominal interest rates would generate even lower output
levels and inﬂation rates.
30
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 380
August 2004A.3 Numerical algorithm (hybrid Phillips curve)
We deﬁne a grid of N interpolation nodes over the state space (u,g,1).A s s o c i -




k(uu + %u,+1,gg + %g,+1,)f(%u,+1,%g,+1)d(%u,+1,%g,+1) (19)
Eky+1 =
Z
yk(uu + %u,+1,gg + %g,+1,)f(%u,+1,%g,+1)d(%u,+1,%g,+1) (20)
where f(·,·) is the probability density function of (%u,%g). The expectations (19)
and (20) are evaluated at each interpolation node using an M node Gaussian-
Hermite quadrature scheme.34 Our numerical algorithm then performs the fol-
lowing steps:
Step 1: Choose N and M and assign the interpolation and quadrature nodes.
Guess initial values for the policy functions y0, 0,a n di0 at the interpo-
lation nodes.
Step 2: At each interpolation node compute the expectations (19) and (20) implied
by the current guess yk, k,a n dik. For given expectation functions, the
Lagrangian of problem (1), (13), (3)-(8) can be written as a recursive
saddle point problem




hk(u,g,1,y,,i,m 1,m 2,E k+1,E ky+1)
+ EVk(u+1,g +1,) (21)
s.t. :
u+1 = uu + %u,+1
g+1 = gg + %g,+1
where
hk(·)=2  y2 + m1[ 
1
1+
(Ek+1 + 1 + y + u)]
+ m2 [y  Eky+1 + *(i  Ek)  g]
34See chapter 7 in Judd (1998) for details.
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one can numerically solve for the ﬁxed point of (21) and the associated
optimal policy functions yk+1, k+1, ik+1, m1
k+1, m2
k+1. Details of this
procedure are described, e.g., in appendix A.2 in our companion paper,
see Adam and Billi (2004).










max is smaller than  where |·|max de-
notes the maximum absolute norm of these functions evaluated at the
interpolation nodes and  > 0 the tolerance level. Otherwise continue
with step 2.
In our application we set N = 1375 and M =9 . Relatively more nodes are
placed in areas of the state space where the policies display a higher degree of
curvature, i.e., at negative values of g where the lower bound is reached. The
support of the interpolation nodes is chosen to cover ±4 unconditional standard
deviations for each of the shocks, and to insure that all values of t lie inside the
state space when using the solution to simulate one million model periods. Since
this can only be veriﬁed after the solution is obtained, some experimentation is
necessary. The tolerance level is  =1 .49108, i.e., the square root of machine
precision. Our initial guess is given by the policy that is optimal in the absence
of the zero lower bound.
To check whether second order conditions hold, we numerically verify if the
right-hand side of (21) is a saddle point, i.e., a maximum with respect to (y,,i)
and a minimum with respect to (m1,m 2), respectively, at the conjectured opti-
mal policy. As is well known, e.g., chapter 14.3 in Silberberg (1990), the saddle
point property is a su!cient condition for having found a constrained optimum.
Technically, we verify the saddle point property by considering a large num-
ber of simultaneous deviations from the conjectured optimum for (y,,i)a n d
(m1,m 2), respectively, at a large number of points in the state space. Due to
the recursive structure of the problem it thereby su!ces to verify the saddle
point property for one-period deviations only.
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 weight on output in the loss function 0.048
42 =0 .003
 slope of the AS curve 0.024
* real rate elasticity of output 6.25
u AR-coe!cient mark-up shocks 0
g AR-coe!cient real rate shocks 0.8
u s.d. mark-up shock innovations (quarterly %) 0.154
g s.d. real rate shock innovations (quarterly %) 1.524
Table 1: Parameter values (baseline calibration)
Discretion Commitment Welfare loss due to discretion
Without zero bound -2.297 -1.770 29.8%
With zero bound -2.656 -1.786 48.7%
Welfare loss due to lower bound 15.6% 0.9%
Table 2: Welfare losses (baseline calibration)
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Tables and figuresParameter Economic interpretation Assigned value






 weight on output in the loss function 0.007
 slope of the AS curve 0.057
* real rate elasticity of output 1
u AR-coe!cient mark-up shocks 0.36
g AR-coe!cient real rate shocks 0.8
u s.d. mark-up shock innovations (quarterly %) 0.171
g s.d. real rate shock innovations (quarterly %) 0.294
Table 3: Parameter values (RBC calibration)
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Figure 2: Optimal policy response
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Figure 3: Optimal policy response to negative real rate shocks
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Figure 4: Positive inﬂation targets
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Figure 5: Welfare eects of positive inﬂation targets
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